本日（米国時間２０１３年７月１５日）、ASSC 17 （San Diego, U.S.A.）で発表（２０分のtalk）する研究のabstractです。
Categorical judgments in visual overflow.
The overflow argument claims that the capacity of phenomenal consciousness exceeds that of cognitive access (Block 2011). Although the idea of phenomenological overflow is consistent with our (naïve) intuition, arguments against visual overflow have been claimed to be consistent with experimental data (Lau and Ronsenthal 2011, Brown 2012). First-order representations of the visual information are not sufficient to give rise to phenomenal consciousness, and a second-order “representation” is necessary (Rosenthal 2005). Is the apparent richness of phenomenal visual experience only a “refrigerator light illusion” (O’Regan 2011)?
The literature on binocular rivalry shows that in order for the subject to see something, the sensory representation arising from V1 should be “matched” with the top-down processes supported by higher order visual areas and prefrontal areas supporting subjectivity (e.g., Logothetis et al. 1996). Higher-order mechanisms that correlate with perpetual changes are not content-specific, but are of a more broad character.
Here I explore the possibility that subjects are able to access generic information in the visual overflow, while being unable to register more specific information (Sperling 1970). Subjects were asked to walk through a typically constructed space, which were new to them. After the walk through, they were presented with a series of questions, including those about specific information as well as generic and categorical judgments about the space.
I discuss how the apparent discrepancy between negative evidence on visual overflow and our (naïve) intuition that we see everything could be reconciled by a model of heterogeneous information spectrum handled by human cognition.